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ABSTRACT: This chapter proposes one definition of critical material-
ism and a critique of politics based on several authors from Marx
to Foucault. This critique occurs in several stages and unfolds as
a criticism of universals such as human freedom, general interest,
political rationality, or reconciled political community. The decisive
materialist-historical question, then, is which of the different material-
ities is dominant at a certain point of time. I argue thatMarx condemns
politics as an illusion. He thought of ‘political reason’ as a form of
‘spiritualism’. Hence, critical materialism argues for a move away from
the illusion of politics.
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The Historicity of Materialism and the
Critique of Politics
ALEX DEMIROVIĆ
In the first part of this chapter, I argue that materialism is not an
alternative form of metaphysics and philosophy, but rather it opens up
the space for an analysis of concrete historical contexts. Materialism
thus moves in opposition to metaphysics, idealism, or spiritualism.
It only becomes necessary under certain historical conditions. The
tradition of critical theory aims at a concept of social development
that renders the necessity of materialist thinking superfluous. In the
second part, based on various authors from Karl Marx to Theodor
Adorno and Michel Foucault, I discuss the ways in which politics
shouldbecome theobject ofmaterialist criticism,whichnotonly (with
its contradictions) makes freedom possible, but also blocks it.
MATERIALISM
Since Marx’s Feuerbach theses, critical theory of society has under-
stood itself as a critical continuation and renewal of the tradition of
materialism. This has meant that it criticizes aspects of idealist philo-
sophy including its denial of matter, its claim that matter is unknow-
able, and the constitutive role of consciousness. Within the context of
this tradition, materialism means, first of all, making nature the object
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of inquiry. Max Horkheimer emphatically emphasized that material-
ism is not another type of metaphysics or philosophy. It is always
— and this is my first thesis — a political-strategic intervention that
contests religious and spiritualist explanations of the world because
such explanations have always been closely connected to domination
and exploitation. Materialism does not aim to create a comprehen-
sive philosophical system of thought, nor is it connected to a body
of philosophical texts; instead, it is concerned with praxis and tries to
contribute to its further understanding.
However, ever since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries ma-
terialism has been predominantly mechanistic and deterministic, and
for that reason it has been criticized by critical theory. While it was fit-
ting thatmaterialismwasmechanistic and deterministic in the Renais-
sance and afterwards, such definitions have proven inadequate for
moremodern phases of social development.Marx criticized themater-
ialist tradition up to the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach for tending
to turn materialism into a philosophy. He wrote that sensuousness,
when viewed philosophically, was conceived as the form of the ob-
ject, or of contemplation, rather than as ‘sensuous human activity’, as
‘objective activity’, which is a practice performed by active people.1 In
opposition to deterministic materialism, Marx argued that this active
side was abstractly developed by idealism. Marx rejected the kind of
naturalism according to which society is constituted as it is because it
is determined by nature, a perspective which included ideas like: tools
as the extension of organs, the genetic determination of individuals,
the existing social division of labour between above and below,women
and men, the powerful and the subaltern, or all such hierarchies that
are given based on the argument that the collective cannot survive
unless the many do not subordinate to the command of the few. As
the contrary of this position, materialism wants to understand natural
and social processes in order to be in a position to push back against
the realm of nature as ‘wholly determined’, and in this way make room
for freedom.
1 This is the first thesis on Feuerbach. Cf. Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, ed. by
Friedrich Engels, in MECW [Marx & Engels Collected Works, see abbreviations], v
(1976), pp. 6-8 (p. 6); in German: Karl Marx, ‘Thesen über Feuerbach’, in MEW
[Marx-Engels-Werke, see abbreviations], iii (1975), pp. 5–7 (p. 5).
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Against the backgroundof this criticism,materialism—according
to Horkheimer and Antonio Gramsci — represents an immanent-
philosophical understanding of humans in relation to the world. This
means that materialism is not about the reduction of society, of
thought and meaning, or of individual or collective action to matter
that is ‘out there’.What is important aboutMarx’s argument here is that
he understands human practice and the external world as a unity, or,
to use Gramsci’s phrase in the Prison Notebooks, as a ‘historical block’.
Accordingly, nature is not grasped as an ‘object’, that is, as an
already-and-always-to-be-found object of rule. Individuals are purpos-
ively active towards nature, that is, towards the ‘outside’. This ‘outside’
is the concrete outside of a historically specific ‘inside’ that people
appropriate and transform through their terms, theories, technologies,
and practices. Indeed,Marx characterizes labour as a ‘process between
man and nature’ in which man ‘mediates his metabolism with nature
through his own action’ (seinen Stoffwechsel mit der Natur durch seine
eigne Tat vermittelt).2 Furthermore, through their activity they also
change, to various degrees, themselves, their thinking, their sensual
experiences, nature, other people, and, finally, the concrete species
itself.
Material practices, it is important to note, include thought and
discourse as social activities and not only as physical and neuro-
physiological processes. The senses, perceptions, experiences, and
concepts all represent concrete practices; each are connected with
specific aesthetic, discursive, or scientific relations, orwith conceptual-
theoretical-technical means of production. Because material practices
intervene in these relationships, they can also be said to shape them.
Materialism opposes the school of thought that subordinates hu-
manpractices tometaphysical principles, norms, or universals. It views
the practices themselves as being historically specific, which includes
the metaphysical and idealist practices and habits of thought that
people engage in within concrete historical relationships. There is
no search for an origin or a primal position, principles from which
everything else can bededuced, or norms that can provide a conclusive
2 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 3 vols (London: Penguin, 1976),
i, trans. by Ben Fowkes, p. 283; translation modified.
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reason formorally correct action.Contrary towhat even criticalmater-
ialism and its followers often claim, economics is not a primal reason
either. It is itself contingent, something that can appear as conditioned
by specific power relationships. Materialism, I argue, does not deal
with desires, projections, or value judgments that deny or gloss over
reality, but rather with the concrete thinking and acting of concrete
people at a particular historical point in time. This kind of materialist
immanence is often subjectively experienced as unsettling and difficult
to bear because there is no ontological assurance, no foundation, no
bottom line in nature and its supposedly eternal laws, no universal
truth, and no sense to history or even to individual existence.
CRITICAL MATERIALISM
Above all else, materialism is critical and historical— and this, follow-
ing Horkheimer, is my second thesis — because what is considered
matter changes historically. Materialism refers to the concrete prob-
lems and challenges that specific people in specific social relations have
to deal with at a certain point in time. This can include the cosmos,
the body, the economy, modes of communication, gender, or the en-
vironment. The appropriation of nature always takes place within a
concrete division of labour among people and the connection of their
actions with tools and nature to form a ‘historical block’; one which
is, under the conditions of ‘pre-history’, not organized rationally but
rather in terms of economic exploitation as well as political or cultural
domination. The decisive materialist-historical question is, therefore,
which of the different materialities is dominant in a given conjuncture
of the circle as a whole: the appropriation of nature, health, science
and technology, state power, culture and consensus, gender relations,
or racism.
To the extent that property relations rule over human beings it is
true to say that they are forced to submit to thosewho claimownership
of the means of production and, in the name of the self-maintenance
of the collective, claim that freedom for all is not yet possible and
the majority of people must therefore be led by a minority in order
to guarantee the survival and welfare of all. According to this view,
sacrifices are expected to maintain the collective. The most recent
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evidence of this practice can be seen in the appeals fromUS politicians
for workers to return to work even if this poses, in the context of the
Sars-CoV-2-pandemic, a threat to their health and life. As President
Trump put it, going back to work could hit individuals hard but what
mattered was reopening the American economy.
Even under this hegemony of capitalist owners there are elements
of freedom in the planning and design of products, in the work process
itself, or in the forms of social cooperation. Critical materialism thus
raises the question of the order of priority of one practice over another.
It criticizes the fact that under conditions of domination the intellec-
tual competencies and practical activities ofmost people are formed in
such a way that enables and sustains the reproduction of domination.
Freedom, thought, concepts, and sensory experiences are of second-
ary importance for many people because they have no control over
fundamental relations, and therefore they distance themselves from
their own capabilities for critical thinking. Materialism thus criticizes
any dependence on the appropriation of nature and argues for an his-
torical change in the order of practices such that people can freely
shape the conditions under which they live. Therefore, materialism is
transformed into what can be paradoxically called material idealism.
POLITICS
Political philosophy often views politics as the sphere of freedom.
Accordingly, politics is not conceived of as a matter of an instrumental
disposition over nature, which would involve the creation of objects,
but rather a challenging collective discussion of issues concerning
living together and the common good. Critical materialism doubts
the validity of such an emphatic conception of politics. Horkheimer
pointedly formulated an opposing position: politics is the epitome of
all the paths that lead to the domination of humans over nature, and of
humans over other humans, and the means by which this domination
is sustained.3 Critical materialism opposes Hegel’s idea that, at least
in the case of the state, there can be an instance of the general and
3 Max Horkheimer, ‘Anfänge der bürgerlichen Geschichtsphilosophie’, in Gesammelte
Schriften, 19 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1987), ii, pp. 177–268 (p. 183).
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an embodiment of a general will, for according to this tradition there
is no overall subject of society or united and reconciled humanity.
Under conditions of market competition and the private ownership
of the means of production, interests are tied together in multiple
ways. Individual self-preservation in the face of possible destruction
depends on others being materially worse off and dependent, and
staying that way. The policies that the state pursues by means of a
multitude of apparatuses are only the result of short or medium-term
compromises between powerful individuals and groups; therefore,
they can be highly diverse and contradictory. Domination prevents
questions concerning the public good from being freely discussed
and decided for in favour of the good of all. Private actors, pursuing
particular interests, make decisions affecting the public good and the
development of society as a whole. In a market, economic freedom is
limited to those few who have asserted themselves within the struggle
over the surplus product and economic competition.
The numerous discussions of this minority, which the bourgeoisie
support within an array of organizations within civil society, repres-
ent a pursuit in which individuals attempt to position themselves
favourably within the struggle over the surplus product and economic
competition; that is, they try to avoid mistakes, anticipate future de-
velopments, pre-empt competitors, and structure actors’ expectations.
Private actors — such as corporations or owners of capital — de-
termine the resources available to society (for example, machines or
rawmaterials) according to certain paths of development, and compel
others to accept this determination or to assert their private interests.
In the event of disappointments, action turns into silence, apathy, and
political distance, or takes the form of protest, which in turn can be
devalued as isolated, and thus inconsequential, events. If all goes ac-
cording to plan, government policies accompany and coordinate these
investment and structuring processes throughout the different areas of
society — that is, industry, finance, development of technology, raw
materials, transport, production of knowledge, work skills and a work
ethic, nutrition, health, housing, and mobility — in order to avoid
too much friction or even setbacks in development (such as when a
factory cannot find the necessary qualified workforce, cannot trans-
port products, has no legal certainty, cannot count on credit, or faces
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bankruptcy). Policies and policy makers must be carefully informed,
influenced, monitored, tested, and evaluated by society’s dominant
actors, because activities within the political sphere are carried out by
individuals unilaterally and according to particular interests: income,
career, or influence. In such a system, inability, ignorance, inefficiency,
corruption, arbitrariness, and conflicts among politicians can affect
political decision making and administration.
Marx described the consequences of this chiasma of factors for
capitalist-bourgeois society very well: Firstly, at the level of private
owners of capital seeking their own benefit, decisions important to
society as a whole are constantly being taken at a sub-political level.
With the increasing centralization of corporate power, the effects of
these decisions constraining the public good continually expand over
time: theymore greatly affect both nature andpeople and reach further
and further into the future. Secondly, the political community inwhich
man behaves as a communal being in terms of the general public serves
only to protect the private interests and needs of citizens as selfish
individuals. This also applies to those who act on behalf of the general
public. The common good is the subject of private calculations by
officials and representatives; it is a practical illusion of the state. In
Marx’s words, the state can be considered an ‘illusory general estate’.4
For, under the conditions he outlined, what is supposed to be general
is not decided upon on the basis of general considerations, but rather
represents a compromise between different powerful groups which is
formed under the leadership of one of these groups. The state is the
particular social practice that enables such compromises between the
individual market players.
Politics is thus bound up with something illusory, something fab-
ricated, andwithMarx’s help Iwould like to explain this idea further. In
his analysis of the French Revolution, Marx argues that in revolution-
ary processes lower classes become political idealists and feel that they
are the representatives of general social needs. Because these classes
see themselves as representing the generality of each particular his-
torical moment, they shape, in each historical moment, the formulas
4 Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, inMECW, iii, pp.
3–129 (p. 50).
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embodying common goals which mobilize the short-term enthusiasm
and agreement of large crowds of people. But the political enthusiasm
of the constitutive moment which seizes people, their political slogans
and formulas, and their coalitions and alliances immediately disperses
in light of the goals and needs of other classes or groups, for whom
the common goals turn out, as the political process continues, to be
deceptions: women (who do not appear at all), urban workers, the
veterans of the revolutionary army, farm workers and small farmers,
and colonized people. That is why Marx criticized ‘political reason’
[politischer Verstand, translated by ‘political mind’] in principle.5
The French revolutionaries of 1789 were paradigmatically tied to
such ‘political reason’. They believed in political power and political
will; therefore, they could not recognize that the source of social de-
ficiencies was to be found in the state, but believed instead that social
deficiencies were the source of political evils.They thought they could
eliminate these evils through politics by trying to establish equality at
the low level and form of a petit-bourgeois equality. This led to politics
becomingmore andmore authoritarian, because revolutionary leaders
such as Robespierre suspected individuals of deliberately opposing
this politics of equality.
Against this viewpoint, Marx argued that no government in the
world can eliminate pauperism— and we can say today thatMarx was
right.6 And the same can be said for the exploitation of nature: despite
many political assurances and treaties, no government in theworldwill
prevent climate change. Therefore, according to Marx, it is wrong to
appeal again and again to a political will. Instead, it would be better to
analyse the material practices of politics and pursue other practices.
5 Karl Marx, ‘Critical Marginal Notes on the Article “The King of Prussia and Social
Reform. By a Prussian”’, inMECW, iii, pp. 189–206 (p. 199); ‘Kritische Randglossen
zu dem Artikel “Der König von Preußen und die Sozialreform. Von einem Preußen”’,
inMEW, i (1981), pp. 392–409 (p. 402).
6 China confirms this insight once again: The Communist Party continues the Jacobin
tradition. However, invoking Communism proves to be in vain if the private or state
disposition over living labour is not eliminated; poverty is renewed and returns at a
higher level, as it always will in all capitalist societies.
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POLITICS AS ILLUSION
Marx has been critically interpreted in such a way that portrays him
as reducing politics to mere appearances and therefore not taking
them seriously enough. Along these lines, Slavoj Žižek has accused
Marxism of understanding politics merely as shadow theatre, but this
kind of criticism is paradoxical and quite contradictory.7 For, when
Marx is properly understood according to a critical materialist theory
of society, ‘illusions’ and ‘shadow theatre’ must be taken very seriously.
They represent their own practices and social realities, which in turn
have effects in the real world.
I want to argue that Marx really did condemn politics as an il-
lusion. He thought of ‘political reason’ [‘political understanding’] as
‘spiritualist’,8 and he meant that seriously and critically, for politics
consumes a lot of time and produces extensive material effects with
its own kind of spiritualism. Marx’s critical point here is that political
reason obscures the roots of social distress and falsifies the insights
of those who really want to change social reality, because thinking in
terms of politics suggests that all surface phenomena are founded on
the will of individuals who do not do what they could or should do.
Everything is transformed into a will; objective processes are person-
alized. The remedy for such a situation seems to be the overthrow of
certain formsof the state. As I already explained above, the spiritualism
of the political does not only act as an obstacle to knowledge but also
represents an additionalmoment in the reproduction of the separation
of the general from the particular, in this case, the community from the
unique life of the individual. In otherwords, the very illusionof politics
is a material practice; and it poses a problem in that it impairs emanci-
patory action because it pursues goals that must remain fruitless.
Although, when speaking of illusion, it would seem tomake sense
to look for the reality behind it, critical materialism asks a different
question; what reality requires these illusions and, contra the Enlight-
enment, always produces them?9 A basic premise of this question
7 Cf. Slavoj Žižek,TheTicklish Subject:The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London:
Verso, 1999).
8 Marx, ‘Critical Marginal Notes’, p. 203.
9 Cf. KarlMarx,Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law. Introduction, in
MECW, iii, pp. 175–87 (p. 176).
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is that a certain reality cannot exist without the illusions also found
within it. Marx’s own research did not only lead him to hard facts, to
economic matters, to nature and work, but instead to another meta-
physical, theological, spiritual level of reality: the metaphysics of the
value of commodities andmoney.This is the illusion he was interested
in. Marx saw money and value as kinds of religious transubstantiation
and also as irrational objects, given his view that human labour has
no value and no price. However, it is characteristic of the capitalist
appropriation of surplus labour from those subjected to domination
that the relations of concrete people — those who perform particular
tasks within the division of societal labour as a whole— take the form
of value, a created thing, with the expended labour power presenting
itself as the value of a commodity.With such a system, people face their
own cooperative labour as an objective relation that unfolds following
the dynamic of the play of supply and demand of the market. What
Marx has discovered has a specific ontological status. For the value of
the human capacity for work is something irrational, something non-
existent and fictitious which nevertheless determines the actions of
people.
Tomake this insight even clearer, one can turn toLouis Althusser’s
explanation of the concept of ideology using the example of religion.
If one were to follow the Enlightenment’s critique, one would ar-
gue that there is no God. In this case, the expectation is that people
will no longer believe in Him because, based on scientific, evidence-
based knowledge, one can say that there is no such world above the
clouds. However, surprisingly, one finds that people continue to be-
lieve inGod, in the power of the star constellations or in natural forces.
Here it is a matter of how religions are criticized, for according to the
Enlightenment’s understanding, belief in God is described in the psy-
chological and philosophical terms of a philosophy of consciousness:
it is understood as something that takes place sensibly in the flow of
thought of the individual and that refuses to reason and reflect empir-
ically.
From the perspective of critical materialism, one would speak of a
false consciousness that should in fact dissolve. But the deeper ques-
tion is to ask why the belief in God persists, reproduces, and even
spreads. This is the starting point of Althusser’s theory of ideology.
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Its decisive modification in the conception of materialism consists in
precisely the sort of analytical shift I have outlined regarding religion.
According to his theory of ideology, religious beliefs and attitudes
must be taken seriously: God exists simply because He is a worldly
practice of individuals and collectives. Practices take place as though
He existed: people kneel, fold their hands, sing hymns, kill others in
the name of God, or have their children baptized. Althusser carries out
a materialist proof of God by showing how He exists in all these prac-
tices, rituals, and discourses. Althusser’s theory is useful to show how
these processes reproduce certain kinds of subjectivization which, at
the same time, subjugate people and make them into the free subjects
of their actions, which in turn isolates them fromeach other and brings
them under a collective ‘third term’, whether it be God or nation or
gender.
I think a distinction made by Foucault would be helpful here to
understand the peculiar ontological distinction between being and
consciousness which is at play here. Foucault argues that one has to
leave aside universals such as the people, state, or civil society, and
start instead with concrete practices. Pursuing this line of thought, he
claims that madness, delinquency, and sexuality do not exist as such
[as ‘ready-made object’] and yet are nevertheless something.10 He is
gesturing toward those ‘interferences’, which make ‘something non-
existent still somethingwhile remaining non-existent’. Analogously, he
also says that the economy and politics do not exist, as they are not
existing things, errors, illusions, or ideologies. They are ‘things that do
not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality’.11
POLITICS AS ILLUSION: TWO MISUNDERSTANDINGS
According to critical materialism’s understanding of things, politics is
really a kind of spiritualism and it is illusory. It does not exist, but with
10 Cf. Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France,
1977–78, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson (Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan, 2007), p. 118;
andMichel Foucault,TheBirth of Biopolitics: Lectures at theCollège de France, 1978–79,
ed. by Arnold I. Davidson (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 19.
11 Foucault,The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 20.
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its interferences it is and does something.This point ismadewith three
arguments that I would like now to briefly repeat and expand on.
a)The political community appears as the authority of the general
and confirms individuals in their bourgeois, selfish isolation from each
other. Individuals experience their social context through money and
the state. They only experience their connection — entirely in the
religious tradition — through a third, a general, to which they have
to submit and over which they have hardly any influence. Individuals
always remain particular and face the state as the general, and the state
as general confronts them in the form of legal norms or administrative
power as a foreign force. This still applies even if you can identify with
individual regulations and measures, or if you also enjoy advantages.
For just as they can favour an individual or a group in the name of
the general public, they can also disadvantage them in the name of the
general public.
b) Politics personalizes social processes because everything ap-
pears as a result of a will of individuals, their power, their special ability
or inability. The general cannot appear directly as a general, but must
always take the form of individual actors. This gives the impression
that political goals are not being pursued, or are not being pursued
adequately, because the wrong person is responsible or is doing the
wrong thing and vice versa: if a policy is to be prevented, it appears as
if a concrete person is the obstacle and must therefore be pushed out
of the political function (‘Merkel must go’).
c) There can be no collective subject and no collective will under
capitalist conditions, the general is illusory. Powerful particular forces
agree on a compromise onhow todivide anduse the power of the state.
I would like to now briefly address two possible misunderstand-
ings. The first misunderstanding is that the state is associated with
the claim to generality: it is the means through which generally bind-
ing rules are created and enforced. However, these rules, which af-
fect many social contexts, always represent compromises that relevant
forces can agree upon at a certain point in time. The struggle for the
establishment of general rules and their use is an ongoing one, so they
are never, in fact, general. The general is constantly being postponed.
For example, bureaucracies can undermine it, powerful social actors
can ignore a rule, try to enforce new rules, make use of grey areas of
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existing rules, or use laws to dominate weaker social agents, who then
have to fight for new rules but cannot prevail for years or decades. In
this way the generality of the law becomes a powerful force against the
subaltern.
The second misunderstanding concerns the illusionary general.
When using this term, I do not draw upon the Rousseauian expecta-
tion of a real, uniform general public, as if there could be a people’s
sovereign who was not shaped by many different interests and ways
of life. However, I also do not draw on the expectation that discursive
decision-making in the public sphere could solve the problem of the
illusory character of the general. Rather, from the point of view of crit-
ical materialism, we are concerned here with two things. Firstly, new
forms of coordination must arise from within the social processes of
work, whereby those who do socially performed work also coordinate
themselves, and no longer fall under the command and control rights
of powerful owners. Secondly, there will be different interests, but
thesewill be coordinated according to thenatureof the specific socially
performedwork to be done by those performing it. Coordination does
not take place under the aegis of the (national) state as the general,
but is a collective will that is determined by those who take part in
decision-making from the perspective of their contribution to overall
socially performed work.
THE REALITY OF GHOSTS
Critical materialism can be said to be concerned with the reality of
ghosts and the undead precisely because the political mind is spiritual,
and because the economy is theological and metaphysical, and there-
fore involves the rule of the dead over the living. The consequences
for a materialist relationship to politics is obvious. It is critical of and
dismissively hostile to politics as well as the economy. Marx, as well as
Althusser and Foucault, all argue against acting politically, for politics
represents an imaginary, that is, a metaphysical form of practice, one
which has far-reaching consequences for people, especially in its ima-
ginary, metaphysical form. Since Marx, critical materialism has been
concerned with not restricting itself to prehistory, but to give space
instead to world-opening practices — that is, to a freedom that is no
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longer restricted by the ‘prehistory’ of the preservation interests of the
owners of dead capital.
Foucault argues that criticizing the local power of psychiatric prac-
tices and institutions of prisons, or blaming reason in general, is not
enough. According to him, one must ask how such power relations
are rationalized. Asking this question ‘is the only way to avoid other
institutions, with the same objectives and the same effects, from taking
their stead’.12 Liberation is achieved only by attacking the roots of
political rationality itself.
But for the time being, politics cannot be avoided, as Foucault
proved beyond measure with his own engagement. In a similar vein,
Adorno argued for a dialectical understanding of the nature of the
political. Although politics is ideological and an epiphenomenon, it
is in fact covering up what is actually going on: it has, in short, real
effects. But politics also has the potential to act on the societal sub-
structure and change it.13 That is why the decisive practice takes the
form of politics — but with the aim of abolishing this form.14 It is a
Beckett-like situation: even if you cannot go on, you have to go on; so
that, paraphrasingMarx,15 once humans [the world] awaken from the
dreamabout themselves that they live in, andwith their last rather than
their first political act enter into their own, self-created reality, they
will become materialists — but this will only be possible if they have
moved beyond both idealism and materialism.
TRANSLATED BY RON FAUST
12 Michel Foucault ‘“Omnes et Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason’, in
EssentialWorks of Foucault 1954–1984: Power, ed. by Paul Rabinow, James D. Faubion
(New York: New Press, 2001), pp. 298–325 (p. 325).
13 Theodor W. Adorno, Philosophische Elemente einer Theorie der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt
a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2008 [1964]), footnote, p. 67.
14 Letter from Adorno to Horkheimer 11 March 1957, in Adorno,Theodor W., and Max
Horkheimer, Briefwechsel, 4 vols, inTheodor W. Adorno. Briefe und Briefwechsel, 8vols
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1994–), iv.4: 1950–1969 (2006), p. 454.
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